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Unilateral Coercive Measures: Towards 




The use of coercive measures including economic sanctions has been favoured by certain, 
predominantly Western, states as an alternative to the use of armed force, asserting pressure to 
effect change at arm’s length via an apparently non-lethal use of force. Yet the assumption that 
the use of economic sanctions presents ‘non-lethal’ and ‘non-destructive’ solutions is a 
misapprehension.1 For the target state, the impact of multilateral and unilateral coercive 
measures (UCMs) on its humanitarian capacity can be long-term and devastating, and can be 
the cause, directly and indirectly, of the collateral damage of gross human rights and 
humanitarian violations.  
 Concerns about the humanitarian implications of comprehensive sanctions (both 
multilateral and unilateral) have been well rehearsed, for example, in the wake of the 
consequences suffered by the general population of Iraq and Haiti in the 1990s.2 The public 
and political outcry that followed prompted a move by the Security Council away from 
comprehensive measures to those designed to be ‘smart’ by targeting named individuals, 
groups, governments and organisations.3 Yet, somewhat ironically, compared to 
comprehensive measures, the humanitarian impact of smart sanctions has been said to be more 
difficult for the target state to circumvent because they are more difficult to ‘cheat’.4  
 
1 WM Reisman and DL Stevick, ‘The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Economic 
Sanctions Programmes’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 86, 95. 
2 See, eg, DW Drezner, ‘Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice’ (2011) 13 
International Studies Review 96, 97–99; ME O’Connell, ‘Debating the Law of Sanctions’ (2002) 13 European 
Journal of International Law, 59; and WM Reisman, ‘Assessing the Lawfulness of Non-military Enforcement: 
The Case of Economic Sanctions’ (1995) 89 American Society of International Law Proceedings 350. 
3 UNSC ‘Speakers for Clearer Definition, Tighter Targeting of UN Sanctions as Council Draws on ‘lessons 
learned’ to Refine Sanctions’ (17 April 2000) Press release SC/6845.  
4 O’Connell, ‘Debating the Law of Sanctions’ (2002) 79, citing ‘US Plan for Smart Sanctions must be “Nipped in 
the Bud”, Iraq’, Agence Fr Press (14 May 2001) 2001 WL 2405528. 
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 Contemporary use of UCMs has followed the Security Council’s move away from 
comprehensive sanctions to targeted measures. UCMs are a source of controversy for a number 
of reasons, for example: they fall outside of the scope of the United Nations Charter; they are 
not authorised by relevant UN bodies; and they contravene ‘the basic principles of the 
multilateral trading system’.5 Concerns persist about the legality of such unilateral measures 
and that they negatively impact the socioeconomic development of developing countries.6 
Whilst ostensibly designed to ‘apply pressure to bring about a change in the conduct of the 
target’,7 their impact can result in significant collateral damage to the socioeconomic status 
and basic human rights of the broader population.8 Direct and indirect effects include 
disrupting and destabilising supply chains for the provision of essential services and supplies, 
including power, medical supplies and foodstuffs, and limiting access to healthcare and 
education, as well as threatening the right to life and breaching the individual human rights of 
named subjects.9  
 UCMs are taken in this chapter to be sanctions imposed by one state, or by a regional 
body of states (such as the EU), against another in response to an alleged breach by the target 
state of its obligations under international law.10 The primary focus is upon economic UCMs, 
defined as  
measures of an economic – as contrasted with diplomatic or military – character taken by 
states to express disapproval of the acts of the target state or to induce that state to change 
some policy or practice or even its governmental structure.11  
 
5 UNGA Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Unilateral economic sanctions as a means of political and economic 
coercion against developing countries’ (2017) UN Doc A/72/307, para 1. 
6 ibid. Although, as Surya Subedi notes in this collection, the argument that the use of UCMs is by developed 
nations against developing is weakened by the imposition of measures against Qatar and Syria by other developing 
Arab states. 
7 V Lowe and A Tzanakopoulos, ‘Economic Warfare’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 10. 
8 For a review of the broader impact of US economic sanctions requiring the disclosure by companies of certain 
minerals in their supply chain originating from the Democratic Republic of Congo or neighbouring countries, M 
Owen, ‘The Limits of Economic Sanctions under International Humanitarian Law: The Case of the Congo’ (2012) 
48 Texas International Law Journal 103, 112. 
9 OHCHR, ‘Thematic study of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, including recommendations on actions 
aimed at ending such measures’, (2012) A/HRC/19/33, para 27, citing European Court of Justice, Kadi Case, 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v 
Council and Commission, European Court of Justice, 3 September 2008, 47 ILM 923 (2008), paras 348 and 349, 
where the Court held that the applicants’ rights of defence as well as their right to an effective legal remedy had 
in fact been infringed. 
10 A more detailed assessment of the definition and legality of unilateral economic sanctions and retorsion is 
provided elsewhere in this collection, in particular see chs 1 and 2 by Profs Surya Subedi and Nigel White 
respectively. For this reason, only brief consideration of these matters offered here.  
11 AF Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (Oxford University Press 2002) 698. 
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The use of economic sanctions is not new. Woodrow Wilson was a proponent of them as a 
powerful weapon causing no injury beyond the target state; he claimed a century ago that: 
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, 
peaceful, silent deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It 
does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted.12 
 Whilst the use of UCMs may be a popular domestic solution for the imposing state, 
those at the mercy of the ‘terrible remedy’ include the broader population of the target state, 
despite the ‘smart’ nature of the sanctions imposed. In particular, ‘the right to life, the rights to 
health and medical care, the right to freedom from hunger and the right to an adequate standard 
of living, food, education, work and housing’ have been cited as coming under threat.13 
Scholars, state representatives, and the Human Rights Council have referred to the use of 
UCMs as ‘economic warfare’.14 The impact of certain UCM regimes has been discussed in 
terms of collective punishment by creating conditions of starvation amongst the civilian 
population, prompting accusations of the commission of a war crime under international 
humanitarian law (IHL).15 However, obtaining quantitative data to evidence that human rights 
and humanitarian law violations are a direct consequence of sanctions and not due to other 
factors, for example domestic mismanagement, is problematic.16  
 The UN Charter provides authority for the use of multilateral sanctions via the Security 
Council;17 however, UCMs employed by one state, or a regional group of states, are not subject 
to a specific and designated legal framework. In the context of this absence, scholarship on the 
humanitarian and human rights implications of UCMs has generally addressed fundamental 
principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHR) 
 
12 Reisman and Stevick, ‘The Applicability of International Law Standards’ (1998) 89, citing SK Padover (ed), 
Wilson’s Ideals (Washington D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs 1942)  
13 UNHRC Res 27/21 (2014), ‘Human rights and unilateral coercive measures’ (03 October 2014) 
A/HRC/RES/27/21. 
14 Lowe and Tzanakopoulos, ‘Economic Warfare’ (2012); ICESCR – General comment No. 8, paras 12–14; 
OHCHR ‘Civilians Caught in Sanctions Crossfire Need Geneva Convention Protection, Says UN Expert’ (8 
November 2018) Press Release. 
15 OHCHR, ‘Thematic study’ (2012) para 10, citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Art 54; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Art 14. 
16 R Garfield and S Santana, ‘The Impact of the Economic Crisis and the US Embargo on Health in Cuba’ (1997) 
87 American Journal of Public Health 15, 15. 
17 Pursuant to Art 39 of the United Nations Charter (the Charter), there is the power for the Security Council to 
pass resolutions imposing ‘measures not involving the use of armed force’ to maintain or restore international 




and, to a lesser degree, the law of countermeasures as encapsulated by ARSIWA (draft Articles 
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts).18 As White and Abass 
observe, the concept of countermeasures under ARISWA ‘is a fairly narrow one at one end of 
a spectrum of non-forcible measures’ whilst ‘at the other end of the spectrum are sanctions 
undertaken by international organizations’, between which ‘there is something of a grey area 
where regulation is rudimentary, indeed, arguably, non-existent’.19 It is in this in-between ‘grey 
area’ that UCMs are situated.  
 This chapter does not set out to debate the comparative nature of the regulatory 
frameworks (or lack thereof) governing multilateral sanctions imposed by international 
organisations, such as the Security Council, countermeasures and UCMs. This is addressed 
elsewhere in this collection. Rather, it provides some analysis of state practice in the use of 
UCMs and explores the proposition that failing their abolition, IHL principles could be applied 
to correct the negative effect of unilateral sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights by, for 
example, examining the application of principles of IHL to both the decision to impose high-
intensity economic UCMs, and to their impact and consequences.  
 Section II briefly outlines an emerging consensus of concern as to the use of UCMs, as 
reflected by the Human Rights Council and related mechanisms. Section III takes particular 
sanctions regimes as case studies to specifically address and explore the relevance and 
application of IHL principles. The focus is primarily on Venezuela and Iran, with illustrative 
reference to Cuba. Consideration is also given in this section to alternative legal recourse via 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and under the Charter of the Organization of American 
States (OAS). Despite the inclusion of humanitarian exceptions to the application of UCMs 
these are, as this section illustrates, largely ineffective.  
 The chapter concludes that whilst arguments against the legality of UCMs are strong, 
the likelihood of a move away from their use is less so. As such, the humanitarian and human 
rights consequences of UCMs must be governed by a legal framework that has key IHL 
principles at its heart and that accommodates the concept of decentralised economic warfare. 
Such a framework should also include the requirement for a human rights / humanitarian 
 
18 See, eg: A Hofer, ‘The Developed/Developing Divide on Unilateral Coercive Measures: Legitimate 
Enforcement or Illegitimate Intervention?’ (2017) 16(2) Chinese Journal of International Law 175; Lowe and 
Tzanakopoulos (n 7); O’Connell (n 2); ND White and A Abass, ‘Countermeasures and sanctions’ in M Evans, 
International Law, 5th edn (Oxford University Press, 2018). 
19 White and Abass (ibid) 524. 
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impact assessment to be conducted before the deployment of UCMs. Without the creation of 
such a framework, there remains the option for the use of economic UCMs to be outlawed 
entirely.  
II The Position of the Human Rights Council  
The Human Rights Council has become increasingly vocal in respect of the use of UCMs, 
indicating disquiet and sharing the concerns held by numerous states as to the motivations for 
their use and impact. This reflects a change in the focus of scholarship in respect of UCMs. As 
Mary Ellen O’Connell explains, the latter part of the 1960s was characterised by discussion of 
the lawfulness or otherwise of economic sanctions imposed by the UN. In the 1990s, the debate 
moved to the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a means to promote human rights and 
democracy. More recently, the focus has been upon an assessment of the human rights and 
humanitarian implications of the use of such measures.20  
 The Human Rights Council defines UCMs as including, but not limited to, ‘economic 
or political measures, to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind’.21 In 2012, the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights reminded states that their actions ‘in the international 
arena must be consistent with customary international law principles and the Charter of the 
United Nations as also interpreted by the International Court of Justice’ and that states must 
refrain ‘from adopting unilateral coercive measures that breach their human rights obligations 
under treaty or customary international law’.22 Furthermore, states ‘should avoid the 
application of any coercive measures having negative effects on human rights, particularly on 
the most vulnerable’ and that ‘essential supplies, such as medicines and food, are not used as 
tools for political pressure, and that under no circumstances should people be deprived of their 
basic means of survival’.23  
 
20 O’Connell (n 2). 
21 UNHRC Res 27/21 (2014) (n 13). This approach echoes Art 20 of the OAS Charter, which requires that ‘No 
State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force 
the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind’.  
22 OHCHR (n 9) paras 39–40. 
23 OHCHR (n 9) paras 41–42. 
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 Building upon these recommendations, two years later the Council unequivocally 
called for states to stop using UCMs, stressing that ‘unilateral coercive measures and legislation 
are contrary to international law, international humanitarian law, the Charter and the norms 
and principles governing peaceful relations among States’.24 The wording of the 2014 
resolution follows much of the wording in a draft resolution proposed the year before by Iran 
(on behalf of the non-aligned movement) and the State of Palestine (on behalf of the Group of 
Arab States).25 That such a draft resolution would be sponsored by Iran and Palestine is not 
surprising – each has a vested interest being targets of sanctions by the US and others.26  
 The final resolution (in tandem with the draft) states that economic UCMs ‘can have 
far-reaching implications for the human rights of the general population of targeted States, 
disproportionately affecting the poor and the most vulnerable classes’, and that long-term 
measures ‘may result in social problems and raise humanitarian concerns’. It calls for states to 
stop ‘adopting, maintaining or implementing unilateral coercive measures’ that are not ‘in 
accordance with international law, international humanitarian law, the Charter of the United 
Nations and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States’.27 It proceeds 
to state the negative impact upon a variety of rights including ‘the right to life, the rights to 
health and medical care, the right to freedom from hunger and the right to an adequate standard 
of living, food, education, work and housing’. 
 The growing concern of the impact of UCMs is further illustrated by the creation of the 
position of  Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on 
the Enjoyment of Human Rights.28 The first appointee to this role (in May 2015), Idris Jazairy, 
called for the international community to give this ‘form of warfare that relies on starvation 
and disease’ the same concern as any other conflict would warrant.29 Subsequent Human 
Rights Council resolutions and endorsed reports reflect the mounting concern for the impact of 
 
24 UNHRC Res 27/21 (2014) (n 13) preamble. 
25 UNHRC Draft Res ‘Human rights and unilateral coercive measures’ (24 September 2013) A/HRC/24/L.5/ 
Rev.1. 
26 See US Treasury Department: sanctions against Palestine, available at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/counter-terrorism-sanctions/palestinian-
authority; and sanctions against Iran, available at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-
sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions. 
27 UNHRC Res 27/21 (2014) (13) para 1. 
28 This position was initially held by Mr Idriss Jazairy (Algeria). Ms Alena Douhan (Belarus) was appointed in 
March 2020; see www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/UCM/Pages/SRCoerciveMeasures.aspx. 
29 OHCHR, ‘Civilians Caught in Sanctions Crossfire’ (2018). 
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UCMs on human rights. In a joint communique in 2016, Russia, China and India came together 
to denounce the far-reaching and negative impact of unilateral sanctions: 
[T]he imposition of unilateral sanctions, which exceed the ones agreed by the United Nations 
Security Council, is inconsistent with principles of international law, undermines the 
prerogatives of the United Nations Security Council as set forth in the UN Charter, reduces 
effectiveness of its sanctions regimes, disproportionally affects States against which they are 
imposed, as well as, when applied extra-territorially, has a negative impact upon third States 
and international trade and economic relations at large. Good-faith implementation of 
principles of sovereign equality of States, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and 
cooperation excludes imposition of unilateral coercive measures not based on international 
law.30 (emphasis added)  
The final words of this statement – ‘not based on international law’ – are central to the 
determination of the lawfulness of measures taken. In the CJEU case of Centro-Com, the Court 
ruled that Member States were permitted to only take measures contrary to EU law when 
seeking to comply with mandatory Security Council resolutions.31 This of itself casts doubt 
upon the legality of measures adopted by individual EU Member States on an autonomous 
basis. This is notwithstanding the arguments pursued below that the lawfulness of UCMs 
should be determined by developing a regulatory / governance regime that incorporates key 
IHL principles to mitigate the detrimental and often severe impact upon fundamental rights 
and freedoms.  
 Under Article 49 ARSIWA, countermeasures must be proportionate and taken as a 
means of inducement, not punishment.32 Furthermore, ‘if they are effective in inducing the 
responsible State to comply with its obligations of cessation and reparation, they should be 
discontinued and performance of the obligation resumed’.33 As section III illustrates, principles 
of proportionality and inducement are apt for application to the governance and regulation of 
UCMs. They ought also to be considered in tandem with two further pertinent questions. 
Firstly, what of those measures that are not effective at inducing compliance? Secondly, what 
of those UCMs whereby the impact is disproportionate and indiscriminate vis-a-vis the 
(alleged) actions / omissions of the targeted state? These questions assist with determining how 
key principles of IHL can be engaged and relied upon when addressing the lawfulness or 
otherwise of the impact of UCMs upon the civilian population. 
 
30 Joint Communique  ́of the 14th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the Republic of 
India and the People’s Republic of China (19 April 2016), para 6, available at 
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1356652.shtml. 
31 ECR I-00081The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England (1997). 
32 ARSIWA, Commentary to Art 49, para 6. 
33 ibid, para 7. 
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III. Applying IHL Principles to UCM Regimes: Case Studies 
This section considers the current use of UCMs against two states, Venezuela and Iran, with 
illustrative reference to Cuba to assess how legal principles in respect of human rights and 
humanitarian law might be engaged. Two factors have determined these states as appropriate. 
At the time of writing, each state is subject to a series of UCMs imposed primarily by the US. 
By and large, the sanctions are framed as being in response to breaches by the target state of 
rights obligations towards its people.  
 The IHL framework under the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols was conceived with the conditions of armed conflict in mind. As such, 
those frameworks are not directly applicable to UCMs that are invoked as a peacetime measure. 
However, the use of UCMs has been said to amount to ‘decentralised’ economic warfare.34 
There may be grounds to argue that imposing UCMs amounts to a form of war, albeit economic 
rather than military, so that the laws of war are, or ought to be, engaged. Even without pursuing 
this line of argument (there is not the scope to do so here35), there are strong arguments that 
IHL principles of necessity, distinction and proportionality can be aptly incorporated to the 
governance of UCMs. Indeed, according to Owen, these are principles that apply to economic 
sanctions in times of peace as well as times of war.36 For Reisman and Stevick, economic 
instruments ‘should be tested rigorously’ against IHL criteria before a decision to use or 
continue with their use is taken.37 They also point to the problematic use of UCMs because of 
‘their relative incapacity to discriminate between licit targets and … their durable resultant 
collateral injuries, which persist long after the conclusion of the campaign’.38  
 Principles of distinction and proportionality are at the heart of customary international 
law,39 and various international instruments address distinction and proportionality in armed 
conflict. Under the Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, it is a grave breach to launch 
‘an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge 
 
34 Lowe and Tzanakopoulos (n 7) 10. 
35 See chs 1–3 for a full discussion of the arguments. 
36 Owen, ‘The Limits of Economic Sanctions’ (2012). 
37 Reisman and Stevick (n 1) 95. 
38 ibid. 
39 ‘IHL Database: Customary IHL’, referring to Rule 14 Proportionality in Attack as a customary rule of IHL, and 
its presence in the Geneva Conventions as well as, eg, ICC Statute and the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule14.  
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that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects’. It is a war crime to intentionally launch an attack during international armed conflict 
‘in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects’ (ICC Rome Statute (1998), Article 8(2)(b)(iv).  
 The principle of proportionality has attracted significant attention as an appropriate 
means of monitoring the use and impact of UCMs.40 Proportionality is also at the heart of the 
law of countermeasures, although it has a separate meaning within that framework, whereby 
‘the potential effectiveness of the measure is not a fundamental criterion’, but rather whether 
the measure is ‘proportional to the original wrong’,41 and adopted as a means of inducement, 
not punishment.42 The focus in this chapter is upon the meaning under IHL rather than the law 
of countermeasures. The principle of necessity under the Geneva and Hague Conventions has 
been descried as permitting the lawful use of force ‘to overpower an enemy’,43 but in a manner 
that is ‘the least destructive measure capable of achieving its desired outcome’.44 Any losses, 
namely collateral damage, ‘should not exceed the expected military advantage’.45 There now 
follows some consideration of how these fundamental IHL principles might be adopted and 
adapted to a governance regime for UCMs. 
A. Venezuela  
As noted above, the principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction require that action 
taken is necessary and proportionate to achieving the objective and distinguishes between the 
target and the civilian population. Satisfying these principles in relation to the imposition of 
UCMs against Venezuela is fraught with difficulty. There may be apparent grounds for 
coercive action to change state behaviour in response to significant state-sponsored human 
rights violations and government mismanagement. However, even though there may have been 
convincing arguments in favour of the principles of necessity, distinction and proportionality 
 
40 See, eg, J Gutmann, M Neuenkirch, F Neumeier and A Steinbach, ‘Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: 
Quantifying the Legal Proportionality Principle’, Research Papers in Economics 2/18 (2018) Universitat Trier, 
Fachbereich IV – Volkswirtschaftslehre, and O’Connell (n 2) 65–79. 
41 O’Connell (n 2) 65 ܺ◌79, 78 and 77 respectively.  
42 ARSIWA (n 32) para 6. 
43 N Tsagourias and A Morrison, International Humanitarian Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary 
(Cambridge University Press, 2018) 39. 
44 Owen (n 8) 118. 
45 R Kolb and R Hyde, An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts (Hart Publishing, 2008) 132, 
cited by Owen (n 8) 118. 
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having been met at the outset, when coercive action risks contributing to and/or causing a 
humanitarian crisis, this may come into doubt as the duration and intensity of the measures 
taken extends.  
 The US has had a series UCMs in force against Venezuela for over a decade. Sanctions 
in the mid-to-late 2000s related to anti-terrorism and drug trafficking measures whilst measures 
in response to anti-democratic actions, human rights violations and corruption followed in 
2014, under Barack Obama’s administration.46 More recent sanctions imposed by Canada and 
the EU, as well as the US, have been presented as a response to human rights abuses under 
Nicolás Maduro’s rule and his government’s mismanagement.47 Maduro and his government 
are no longer recognised by the internal community at large, and the country finds itself in an 
intractable position. It is heavily in debt to mainly US creditors; unable to restructure debt due 
to sanctions preventing dealing by US nationals with the Maduro regime;48 struggling to access 
its gold reserves in the UK;49 and there is a burgeoning humanitarian catastrophe exacerbated 
by an inability to trade with and import food and medical supplies from numerous countries,50 
and further worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic.51  
 The cause of Venezuela’s socioeconomic crisis is complex. Whilst the imposition of 
UCMs and their consequences may have played a significant role, other domestic and global 
factors have been instrumental. As an oil-producing and -exporting country, the Venezuelan 
economy suffered due to the global fall in oil prices in 2008, and recession followed.52 By 
 
46 Congressional Research Service, ‘Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions’ 22 January 2020, available at 
fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10715.pdf. 
47 EU Sanctions Map: Venezuela, available at 
www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main/details/44/?search=%7B%22value%22:%22%22,%22searchType%22:%7B%7D
%7D. The Government of Canada imposed targeted asset freezes and prohibitions on dealing against named 
individuals within the Maduro regime in response to the Maduro Government’s ‘systemic erosion of Venezuela’s 
democratic institutions and its grave human rights abuses’ and pursuant to a 2017 Association between the US 
and Canada, ‘Canadian Sanctions Related to Venezuela’ Government of Canada, available at 
www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-
relations_internationales/sanctions/venezuela.aspx?lang=eng. 
48 Jo Gordon, ‘Off Target: How US Sanctions are crippling Venezuela’ (2018) 145 Commonwealth Foundation 
12. 
49 The "Maduro Board" of The Central Bank of Venezuela (Appellant) v The "Guaidó Board" of The Central 
Bank of Venezuela (Respondent) [2020] EWCA Civ 1249 (permission to appeal was granted by the UK 
Supreme Court to the Respondent in December 2020). 
50 M Weisbrot and J Sachs, ‘Economic Sanctions as Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela’ (Center for 
Economic and Policy Research 2019), available at cepr.net/images/stories/reports/venezuela-sanctions-2019-
04.pdf. 
51 Human Rights Watch, ‘Venezuela: Urgent aid needed to combat Covid-19’ (26 May 2020), available at 
www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/26/venezuela-urgent-aid-needed-combat-covid-19. 
52 M Weisbrot and R Ray, ‘Update on the Venezuelan Economy’ (Center for Economic and Policy Research, 
2010) 4, available at cepr.net/documents/publications/venezuela-2010-09.pdf. 
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2014, the Venezuelan economy was in a ‘free fall’ crisis and burdened by significant debt.53 
Following democratic elections in December 2015, a coalition of opposition parties won a 
majority in the National Assembly.54 President Maduro responded in January 2016 by 
declaring a national emergency and began to rule by decree, dismantling the powers of the 
National Assembly along the way.55 As a result, over the course of the next 18 months a number 
of countries refused to recognise the legitimacy of Venezuela’s National Constituent Assembly 
and its decisions.56 Part of the response of those countries was to impose sanctions in the form 
of targeted economic UCMs to bring Maduro and his government to heel. 
i. Determining Necessity  
Alleged human rights violations committed by the Maduro-led Venezuelan Government and 
those in public office are the subject of a number of matters under investigation by various 
bodies including the International Labor Organization (ILO), the ICC and the Human Rights 
Council. The global focus on the human rights situation in Venezuela may well be used as 
evidence of the necessity for intervention by the international community, but whether UCMs 
are the appropriate and necessary form of intervention would require balance against principles 
of proportionality and distinction. Furthermore, UCMs should be used to effect change in state 
practice. Resorting to UCMs before and/or during formal investigations by bodies such as the 
ILO, the ICC and the Human Rights Council has the potential to undermine the purpose of 
those bodies and amount to arbitrary unilateral action without the consent of the international 
community, perceived as a form of punishment and/or as a tool to promote regime change. 
With the principle of necessity in mind, this section briefly summarises those matters before 
the ILO, ICC and Human Rights Council.  
 Following submission of a complaint by workers unions to the ILO in 2015 and a lack 
of response from the Government of Venezuela, an ILO Commission of Inquiry (CoI) was 
convened in March 2018 to progress the matter further.57 The CoI reported in September 2019, 
 
53 Gordon, ‘Off Target’ (2018). 




56 S Brodzinksy and D Boffey, ‘40 countries protest Venezuela's new assembly amid fraud accusations’ The 
Guardian (2 August 2017), available at www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/02/venezuela-voting-fraud-
corruption-allegations-protests. 
57 ILO, ‘For national reconciliation and social justice in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’, Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry appointed under Art 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to 
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finding the Government to be in breach of its ILO convention obligations. It cited institutions 
and practices that were prejudicial to ‘the existence and action of free and independent 
employers’ and workers’ organizations and the development of social dialogue in good faith 
in a climate of trust and mutual respect’.58 Allegations included murder and acts of physical 
aggression against trade union leaders and members and employer representatives, arbitrary 
detention, interference, control and favouritism.59 Following its investigations, the CoI 
recommended an ‘immediate cessation of all acts of violence, threats, persecution, 
stigmatization, intimidation or other forms of aggression’ against relevant persons and 
organisations, and ‘the adoption of measures to ensure that such acts do not recur in future’.  
 The CoI’s findings were reported in October 2019 with an implementation deadline for 
recommendations being no later than 1 September 2020.60 By this time, UCMs had been in full 
force against Venezuela for some years. Just prior to the CoI’s findings, in September 2019, 
the Human Rights Council resolved to establish an independent international fact-finding 
mission to ‘investigate extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions 
and torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment since 2014, with a view to 
ensuring full accountability for perpetrators and justice for victims’.61 This decision followed 
a report by the High Commissioner for Human Rights based upon 558 interviews, 159 meetings 
and documentary analysis.62 
 Arguably, the Human Rights Council has been slow to take action in response to the 
human rights situation in Venezuela. This might, in part, be due to the presence of Venezuela 
on the Human Rights Council’s membership since 2015.63 Before the Human Rights Council’s 
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58 ibid, ch 7. 
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61 UNHRC, ‘Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention’ (24 September 2019) 
A/HRC/42/L.4/Rev.1, para 24. 
62 OHCHR Report, ‘Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’ (05 July 2019) A/HRC/41/18, paras 
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decision to establish an independent fact-finding mission,64 reports and evidence of state 
repression caused the ICC Prosecutor in February 2018 to open a preliminary investigation into 
crimes allegedly committed in Venezuela ‘since at least April 2017 in the context of 
demonstrations and related political unrest’.65 Later that year, in September 2018, a referral 
was made to the ICC by a number of states parties (Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Chile, 
Paraguay and Peru) against Maduro and his government, requesting an investigation into 
crimes against humanity.66  
 Those states parties, save for Canada and Paraguay, are arrival and/or destination 
countries for Venezuelan refugees.67 The refugee crisis has brought its own pressures to bear 
on those states and challenges in respect of the resurgence of paramilitary activity and the 
presence of organised crime and trafficking through and along Venezuela’s porous border.68 
The Latin-American states making the referral are also in receipt of US development aid, and 
may have geopolitical and diplomatic reasons for making a referral to the ICC that would 
appease the US, although for most of these states aid was reduced in 2019, sometimes 
significantly so.69 Indeed, it would seem that recourse to the ICC is highly politicised with the 
Maduro Government making its own request in early 2020 for the ICC to investigate US 
sanctions as crimes against humanity.70 
 The matter is further complicated when reviewing the political rhetoric that was 
employed by Trump and his administration, which calls into question the motivation for 
imposing UCMs and casts doubt upon their necessity. The US based Center for Economic 
Policy and Research (CEPR) highlights comments by Mike Pompeo, the then US Secretary of 
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State, in March 2019 that give cause to question the motivation for US involvement in 
Venezuela and the use of UCMs. Pompeo is reported as saying: 
Well, we wish things could go faster, but I’m very confident that the tide is moving in the 
direction of the Venezuelan people and will continue to do so. It doesn’t take much for you to 
see what’s really going on there. The circle is tightening, the humanitarian crisis is increasing 
by the hour. I talked with our senior person on the ground there in Venezuela last night … 
You can see the increasing pain and suffering that the Venezuelan people are suffering from. 
[emphasis added] 71 
 CEPR’s analysis is that these comments demonstrate the humanitarian crisis is not 
solely the result of the economic policies of the Venezuelan Government over a prolonged 
period of time, nor simply collateral damage, but is ‘part of the strategy to topple the 
government’.72 Furthermore, CEPR refers to comments made by the US administration that 
betray a broader strategy of appropriating Venezuela’s oil.73 For CEPR, there are grounds to 
argue a breach of Articles 19 and 20 of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter. 
Article 19 enshrines the principle of non-interference, prohibiting ‘not only armed force but 
also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or 
against its political, economic, and cultural elements’. Article 20 refers to coercive measures, 
whereby: ‘No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or 
political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it 
advantages of any kind’.  
 Venezuela remains a member of the OAS, despite reports in April 2017 of its proposed 
withdrawal.74 However, its membership relates to the interim government of Juan Guaidó, 
which is supported by the US and others, rather than the presidential government of Maduro.75 
The US is also a long-standing member of the OAS. Given that Venezuela’s membership is 
recognised by a government led by Guaidó, a close ally to the US, it is unlikely that any action 
would be sought under the OAS Charter against the US, unless it was possible for Maduro’s 
government to secure standing. Even so, statements made by Trump, Pompeo and others could 
well be used as evidence to undermine claims by the US that the use of far reaching UCMs 
was necessary and proportionate. 
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ii. Determining Proportionality and Distinction  
There is a lack of consensus that economic sanctions, whether unilateral or multilateral, 
succeed in reducing the human rights abuses by governments in the target state. Indeed, the 
indication is that such measures intensify and worsen the human rights situation.76 This of itself 
might be sufficient to cast doubt upon imposing UCMs in compliance with the principles of 
proportionality and distinction. Nonetheless, in 2019 the US imposed additional steps to block 
property of the Government of Venezuela and US persons purchasing or using Venezuelan 
government debt as collateral due to human rights abuses and ‘ongoing attempts to undermine 
Interim President Juan Guaido and the Venezuelan National Assembly’s exercise of legitimate 
authority in Venezuela’.77 The US has firmly placed responsibility for ‘the deepening 
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela’ with Maduro’s regime.78 Elsewhere, UCMs are said to be 
the cause of the ‘inability of the government to function’.79  
 Unsurprisingly, US motives have attracted scrutiny, suggesting an underlying agenda 
of regime change rather than purported protection for the people of Venezuela.80 There is a 
danger, as noted by Livingstone Sewanyana, Independent Expert on the Promotion of a 
Democratic and Equitable International Order (appointed as part of the Human Rights 
Council’s Special Procedures), that ‘In order to discredit selected governments, failures in the 
field of human rights are maximized so as to make violent overthrow more palatable. Human 
rights are being “weaponized” against rivals’.81 Weaponising rights and causing injury beyond 
the named targets of the measures calls into question proportionality and distinction.  
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 Whilst EU and Canadian measures against Venezuela are narrow in focus,82 the broad 
and far-reaching impact of US UCMs against Venezuela suggests a failure to adhere to 
principles of proportionality and distinction. There are reports of large numbers of the 
population being denied access to medical, fuel and food essentials, prompting mass migration 
out of the country.83 This indicates violation of the principle of distinctiveness – whilst the 
UCMs are supposedly targeted against named companies and individuals, the impact is on the 
most vulnerable populations without access to financial reserves and at the mercy of alternative 
unregulated markets to secure medical and other essential supplies.84  
 In addition, there are concerns that civilian populations are suffering from starvation. 
One report estimates that between 2017 and 2018 there were 40,000 deaths and widespread 
starvation due to UCMs, prompting allegations of collective punishment.85 In August 2018, 
following his visit earlier that year to Venezuela, Sewanyana found that UCMs by the US, 
Canada and the EU had ‘directly and indirectly aggravated the shortages in medicines such as 
insulin and anti-retroviral drugs’.86 That sanctions had caused delays in distribution had, 
according to Sewanyana, contributed ‘to many deaths’ and should be investigated as a crime 
against humanity by the ICC (under Article 7 of the Rome Statute), but that ‘the geopolitical 
submissiveness of the Court may prevent this’.87 Interestingly, the Venezuelan Government, 
as led by Maduro, rebutted the contents of a report by the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights that found the supplies in hospitals and their capacity seriously wanting, a response that 
could be used to undermine the strength of arguments that the impact of UCMs on the 
Venezuelan healthcare system is in breach of IHL principles.88  
 The UN World Food Programme reported in 2019 that approximately one-third of the 
population in Venezuela was either moderately or severely food-insecure, with a lack of dietary 
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diversity being ‘of major concern’.89 The report refers to depleting coping mechanisms 
amongst families that have used savings to buy food and to a deterioration in basic services 
(water, sanitation, housing, electricity, cooking facilities).90 Yet food insecurity has plagued 
the people of Venezuela for some time.91 Attributing food and other insecurities to UCMs 
would be subject to further investigation. If it was found that UCMs increased food, energy 
and/or medical insecurity there would be grounds upon which to suggest that both 
proportionality and distinction were in breach.  
 Compliance with the principles of proportionality and distinction are also called into 
question by the extraterritorial scope of the US’s UCMs, which significantly interferes with 
world trade and inter-state trading relationships. The US has specifically threatened sanctions 
against India if it continues to purchase oil from Venezuela.92 By seriously limiting access to 
trade, extraterritoriality has been cited as contributing to Venezuela’s move from high inflation 
to hyper-inflation, and putting vulnerable populations at greater risk by exacerbating the lack 
of access to essential services and supplies such as food, medicine and energy.93  
 The issues raised in this section are not peculiar to Venezuela. The US sanctions regime 
against Cuba has been running in some form or another since 1960.94 Alleged consequences of 
the UCMs against Venezuela mirror, for example, reports of the severe and detrimental impact 
of US unilateral sanctions against Cuba and its public health infrastructure, supplies and 
outcomes.95 The effects of sanctions have also been described in terms of gross violations of 
humanitarian principles. Following the US’s escalation in UCM pressure against Cuba, the 
Cuban Foreign Minister stated in 2019 that, ‘the blockade has caused incalculable humanitarian 
damages. It is a flagrant, massive and systematic violation of human rights’. He described the 
blockade as an act of genocide pursuant to Articles II(b) and (c) of the Convention on the 
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Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), stating ‘there is not one single 
Cuban family that has not suffered the consequences of this’.96  
 In contrast, there is scholarship that celebrates the relative success of Cuba’s response 
to US sanctions. Cuba has succeeded, despite the crippling effect of the sanctions on its trade 
with the US, to function and manage its public services, albeit at times at reduced capacity, and 
by taking measures to fight corruption in public office,97 as well as diversifying its trading 
relations.98 Even so, it remains that despite having been imposed for over five decades, US 
sanctions have failed to achieve the US’s ultimate objective of regime change,99 and the 
duration and intensity of the UCMs surely calls into question their necessity, proportionality 
and distinction.  
B. Iran 
The US sanctions regime against Iran first began in 1979 in the form of a blocking order against 
all property and interests in property of the Iranian Government.100 UCMs were used to impose 
further pressure in the early 2010s by the UN and the EU as well as the US in response to Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions and human rights violations.101 The primary objective of EU measures was 
couched in human rights terms. Asset freezes and travel restrictions were introduced against 
those involved in ‘grave human rights violations in the repression of peaceful demonstrators, 
journalists, human rights defenders, students or other persons who speak up in defense [sic] of 
their legitimate rights’.102 In addition, sanctions prohibiting access to equipment used for 
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internal repression and telecommunications equipment were imposed. Restrictions could be 
extended to those: 
[C]omplicit in or responsible for directing or implementing grave violations of the right to due 
process, torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, or the indiscriminate, excessive and 
increasing application of the death penalty, including public executions, stoning, hangings or 
executions of juvenile offenders in contravention of Iran’s international human rights 
obligations. 103 
i. Determining Necessity and Proportionality 
The impact of sanctions is said to have played a part in prompting Iran to enter the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),104 which led to the lifting of the majority of the 
UCMs (and UN sanctions) that had been imposed in the early 2010s.105 This change in Iranian 
state practice could indicate that the imposition of UCMs in the early 2010s was a necessary 
and proportionate means of affecting a change in the actions of Iran’s ruling regime. However, 
in May 2018 the US withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed UCMs against Iran. This was 
in response to Iran publicly stating it would deny the International Atomic Energy Agency 
access to military sites and, two years earlier, having twice violated the JCPOA’s heavy-water 
stockpile limits. The US declared the reimposed sanctions to be the ‘toughest U.S. sanctions 
ever imposed on Iran’, designed to ‘target critical sectors of Iran’s economy, such as the energy, 
shipping and shipbuilding, and financial sectors’, with the US promising to engage ‘in a 
campaign of maximum financial pressure on the Iranian regime … to enforce aggressively 
these sanctions that have come back into effect’.106 
 Reimposed UCMs included blocking sanctions: to prevent Iran from purchasing US 
bank notes or precious metals; against certain Iranian persons, for example, to prohibit any 
transactions in foreign exchange and transfers of credit or payments between financial 
institutions or by, through, or to, any financial institution subject to the jurisdiction of the US 
and in which the sanctioned person has any interest; against Iran’s energy, shipping, and 
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shipbuilding sectors and port operators, measures to prevent trade with the automotive and 
petroleum sector, and more.107 In addition, sanctions were imposed against both US and non-
US persons dealing with the Iran’s civil aviation industry.108  
 The EU has expressed its view of the extraterritorial aspect of the UCMs by amending 
its Blocking Regulation to circumvent the extraterritorial scope of US sanctions.109 This 
response calls into question the proportionality of the UCMs imposed by the US and is 
consistent with the EU’s position on this in the past. In 1996, the EU filed a complaint with the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) against the extraterritorial reach of US sanctions against 
Cuba, Iran and Libya contained in the US’s Helms-Burton and D’Amato-Kennedy Acts.110 It 
withdrew the complaint for further consideration, proceeding instead to pass the Blocking 
Regulation to prohibit EU Member State compliance with the extraterritorial sanctions, and to 
protect the interests of EU Member States that suffered loss as a result.111 The EU has yet, 
however, to enforce the Blocking Regulation, and so whilst it is ‘symbolically important’, it is 
‘largely seen as toothless’.112  
 The EU has, however, reiterated its position in respect of the secondary aspects of the 
sanctions against Cuba.113 This reflects the almost universal position of the international 
community as illustrated by the voting on a General Assembly resolution in 2018 on ending 
US sanctions against Cuba, where 189 states voted in favour of the resolution with only the US 
and Israel voting against (and with no abstentions).114 Furthermore, France, Germany and the 
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UK have taken direct action to bypass extraterritorial constraints to establish the Instrument in 
Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) to allow EU economic entities to trade legitimately 
with Iran.115 The first transaction via this mechanism took place in April 2020, enabling the 
sale of medical supplies from the EU to Iran.116  
 In defiance of the US’s imposition of extraterritorial UCMs, this is a bold step taken to 
demonstrate EU commitment to the JCPOA with Iran.117 It indicates a refusal to comply with 
US secondary measures, suggesting those measures are unnecessary, disproportionate and 
unlawful. Indeed, it has been said that it is ‘an emergent (if not already established) rule of 
customary international law’ that UCMs ‘with secondary or extraterritorial effects, “which 
affect the sovereignty of other States, the legitimate interests of entities or persons under their 
jurisdiction and the freedom of trade and navigation”’ are almost universally seen by the 
international community as unlawful.118  
 There would appear to be a growing consensus that ‘sanctions that extend beyond 
national borders, and which seek to block a country’s trade altogether, amount to economic 
warfare against civilians’ where people ‘die, but from lack of food and medicine, rather than 
from explosive devices’.119 However, and despite the signal the amendment of the EU Blocking 
regulation (a regulation that also applies to Cuba) and establishment of INSTEX sends, as Joy 
Gordon comments, ‘for banks, shipping companies, insurers, technology companies, or the 
energy industry, the bottom line is that no one can risk losing access to U.S. markets, regardless 
of whether U.S. sanctions accord with international law’.120 The continued dominance of the 
US in terms of global trade means that private entities are likely to comply with the extra-
territorial scope of sanctions, deepening the negative human rights and humanitarian effects of 
UCMs. 
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ii. Determining Distinction 
In the midst of the sanctions against Iran in the first half of the 2010s, concerns were raised of 
another pending humanitarian disaster due to a lack of medical and laboratory supplies. As Ali 
Gorji explains, whilst the sanctions did not make direct reference to medical supplies, the flow 
into the country of medical supplies was interrupted due to ‘difficulties in holding license [sic] 
for export of medicine, financial transaction, and shipment as well as fear of possible U.S. 
sanction by pharmaceutical companies and international banks’.121 Studies indicate that during 
that period, the significant negative impact upon health and medical supplies affected the 
treatment of numerous conditions, including diabetes, cancer, asthma and pulmonary disease 
as well as anti-viral, anti-depressant drugs and medication and those related to transplants and 
more.122 In addition, one study concludes that indirect effects of UCMs include an increased 
presence of carcinogenic air pollution.123 These studies highlight detrimental consequences of 
UCMs beyond their named targets to the broader population, in breach of the principle of 
distinction.  
 Following the reintroduction by the US of UCMs in 2018, concerns were raised that 
although sanctions contained humanitarian exemptions, issues relating to international 
interbank transfers ‘may make such exemptions inoperative’.124 Iran was swift to act in 
submitting an application to the ICJ in July 2018, alleging violations by the US of the Treaty 
of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights (agreed between the two states in 1955).125 
Iran included a request for ‘provisional measures’ to preserve its rights under the 1955 Treaty, 
pending the Court’s final decision in the case. Finding that the US’s obligations under the 
bilateral treaty were engaged, the ICJ unanimously ordered a number of provisional measures. 
These included that the US ‘remove any impediments’ to the free exportation to Iran of supplies 
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for medicine and medical equipment, foodstuffs and agricultural commodity, and equipment 
and services necessary for the safety of civil aviation that were otherwise interrupted as a result 
of the reimposed sanctions.126 In doing so, the ICJ acknowledged the potential of economic 
sanctions to cause ‘irreparable prejudice’.  
 The ICJ’s court order and its recognition of the potential negative impact of US 
sanctions against Iran could well be used as evidence of a violation of both the principle of 
proportionality – whether such measures were proportionate in response to Iran’s 
disengagement at that stage with the JCPOA, and the principle of distinction – because the 
effect of the measures would appear to go well beyond the named targets to impact a significant 
proportion of the civilian population. Action by the US since the ICJ’s order suggests it is in 
breach of the Court Order, having implemented additional sanctions and having been slow to 
make changes with ‘uncertain benefit’ in respect of access to medical supplies and 
equipment.127 
IV. Conclusion  
Sanctions are silent killing, especially for those who are dealing with chronic diseases or 
emergency disorders; the needful are left abandoned.128 
The arguments against the legality of UCMs are significant. Whilst their design has followed 
the Security Council’s approach of using targeted sanctions, UCMs are unlawful being beyond 
the scope of the UN Charter, and as such are not subject to the authority of the Security Council. 
They undermine and contravene the principles of the multilateral trading system; studies 
indicate that UCMs are highly disruptive to supply chains of essential services and supplies 
and the capacity of the target state to trade. Consequently, their socioeconomic impact directly 
and indirectly causes gross human rights abuses and humanitarian suffering whilst, 
paradoxically, there is little evidence that UCMs succeed in meeting their stated objective. 
 There is not universal condemnation of the use and/or impact of UCMs. There is, 
unsurprisingly, a divide between those that situate the cause of the human rights and 
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127 J Klingler, B Barnes and T Sepheri, ‘Is the US in Breach of the ICJ’s Provisional Measures Order in Alleged 
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity?’ (2020) 24(12) American Society of International Law.  
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humanitarian suffering with the government of those people, and those that attribute 
humanitarian crisis to states imposing UCMs. Both positions risk being politicised and 
polarised, failing to take account of complex historical, systemic and geopolitical factors. 
However, evidence from various studies and sources cited in this chapter indicates that the 
consequences of UCMs all too often adversely affect those suffering from the human rights 
abuses that sanctions are purportedly imposed to address. Furthermore, such evidence indicates 
that the sanctions often fail to be effective at securing their stated objective: a change in state 
behaviour.  
 Described as ‘economic terrorism’129 and ‘economic asphyxiation’,130 the deployment 
of UCMs has been compared to ‘medieval sieges of towns with the intention of forcing them 
to surrender’.131 The citing of human rights abuses by the target state as grounds for 
intervention by the imposing state has been portrayed as a veil for action driven by political 
ideology often to support regime change.132 Jorge Arreaza Montserrat, Venezuela’s Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, has referred to the US’s action against Cuba as ‘imperial arrogance’ 
amounting to collective punishment.133 In a similar vein, Iran’s delegate before the UN said 
the US ‘has been addicted to imposing unilateral sanctions when it comes to States that do not 
submit to, or follow, its contradictory and expansionist policies’.134 
 Former Special Rapporteur on UCMs, Idriss Jazairy, has called for the international 
community to give the ‘form of warfare’ meted through unilateral sanctions ‘that relies on 
starvation and disease’, the same concern as an armed conflict would warrant.135 As this 
contribution has demonstrated, the laws of war in relation to the principles of necessity, 
proportionality and distinction, and the prohibition of collective punishment, are apt for 
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application to the decision to impose and the continued use of UCMs. Yet, in taking this 
approach, there is an implicit acceptance of UCMs as a legitimate means of resolving inter-
state issues, which of itself is contrary to the position of certain states (see reference to China, 
India and Russia above, for example) and the Human Rights Council. Furthermore, just 
because those principles might be applied, it does not mean they can be easily satisfied.  
 Pursuant to the principle of distinction, attacks must not be directed against the civilian 
population.136 UCMs present a particular difficulty in satisfying this principle because there is 
an ‘incapacity to discriminate between licit targets and because of their durable resultant 
collateral injuries, which persist long after the conclusion of the campaign in which they were 
deployed’.137 Humanitarian and human rights protection is ostensibly incorporated into 
sanctions regimes via humanitarian exceptions designed to permit the safe passage of essential 
medical supplies, health services and food, etc into the target state. However, as noted, the lack 
of access to international interbank transfers and the extraterritorial reach of US sanctions has 
been cited as compromising access and capacity to trade in these supplies.  
 In addition, the prohibition of collective punishment broadly requires that a population 
should not be punished for acts of individuals that the population cannot be regarded as jointly 
and severally responsible for.138 Targeted UCMs are aimed at specific people and entities yet 
the failure to distinguish between the target and the general populace has been described at its 
most extreme as causing starvation and suffering tantamount to collective punishment.139 If 
UCMs are to be used as a means to effect change in state practice in compliance with IHL, 
their focus should be proportionate and distinctive in relation to that objective. One compelling 
recommendation is for a human rights impact assessment test to be conducted before 
implementing sanctions unilaterally, and to monitor on a regular basis the effects of the 
measures, including their adverse effect on human rights.140 This could include a ‘contextual 
inquiry’ where the impact of potential UCMs is measured ‘against the criteria of the 
international law of armed conflict and other relevant norms of contemporary international law 
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before a decision is made to initiate or to continue to apply them’.141 Without such an 
assessment being undertaken, the use of UCMs would be unlawful.142 
 In the meantime, the US maintains a robust approach seeking to undermine its 
adversaries using unilateral sanctions to full effect as demonstrated by the recent passing of the 
Ceasar Syrian Civil Protection Act 2019, although much of what is contained in this Act has 
been subject to sanctions for some time under Executive Orders introduced by the Obama 
administration.143 The 2019 Act encompasses regimes supporting Assad in Syria by citing 
human rights abuses in Syria as the basis for action so that, ‘Instead of Iranian and Hezbollah 
actors looking like they are being targeted on political grounds, they now could be targeted on 
the basis that they are supporting the unprecedented human rights abuses in Syria’.144  
 Although there is evidence of a groundswell against the unilateral actions of the US 
with states taking action to defy the extraterritoriality of certain US economic sanctions (see 
the reference to INSTEX, the amended European Blocking Regulation, and recent Human 
Rights Council Resolutions, above), more decisive geopolitical action at an international level 
would be needed to police the use of UCMs. Despite growing calls by states, the Human Rights 
Council and Special Rapporteurs to refrain from imposing UCMs, it is unlikely that the US, 
and others, would desist. The US is the main champion of high intensity UCMs and under 
Donald Trump the US’s exceptionalism approach to geopolitics arguably expanded, whilst 
engagement with international organisations such as the Human Rights Council and the World 
Health Organization contracted. It remains to be seen what strategy the US will adopt under a 
fresh, Joe Biden-led, administration.  
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